Abstract: Since the mid-1990s, an almost universal belief has developed amongst economic commentators that the United States has undergone a productivity miracle and that European economies are now suffering from chronic sclerosis. As a result, the "American model" dominates the agenda of policy towards growth and productivity performance in Britain. This paper urges caution here, given the disappointing experience of earlier British growth policies based on borrowing from the fashionable economy of the moment, including the Japanese and German economies during the 1970s and 1980s, and the American economy (again) during the 1950s and 1960s. A historical perspective suggests that: (1) Successful productivity performance requires a stable institutional framework for long term investments in human and physical capital, which the European model has been particularly good at providing over the last half century. (2) A country is constrained by its geography, so that copying without adaptation to local circumstances is rarely a good policy. (3) It is important to pay attention to the different sectors of the economy when formulating policy.
"It is but too clear, then, that on all hands England's industrial supremacy is tottering to its fall, and that this result is largely German work." 1 "Another striking feature [of manufacturing establishments in the United States] is the admirable system everywhere adopted; …….. this applies not only to the selection and adaptation of tools and machinery, and to the progress of the material through the manufactory, but also to the discipline and sobriety of the employed." 2 "Comparison of the available indicators of science and technology activities confirms the astonishing Japanese progress over the past 30 years in comparison with both Europe and the United States." 3 "If British productivity were as high as American, many (indeed most) of Britain's domestic economic problems would disappear." 4 "In recent years many observers have charged that American industry is not producing as well as it ought to produce, or as well as it used to produce, or as well as the industries of some other nations have learned to produce. If the charges are true and if the trend cannot be reversed, then sooner or later the American standard of living must pay the penalty." 5 " [W] e may point to the superior natural resources of the United States or to freedom from legislative restrictions; but Germany has no such superior resources or freedom from restrictions……..By taking both [countries] we are saved from such fallacies." 
I. INTRODUCTION
The above quotes illustrate the hazards of fixing on a single country to emulate in formulating policy on economic growth. Countries fall in and out of fashion, and features identified as the secret of success in one country can be shown to be absent in other successful countries. Nevertheless, since the mid-1990s, the United States has been held up by most economic commentators as the model to emulate in policy on productivity performance, with a particular emphasis on the diffusion of ICT in the "new economy" (HM Treasury, 2000; Baily and Kirkegaard, 2004; McKinsey Global Institute, 2002; OECD, 2003) . Before that, Germany and Japan were popular models with an emphasis on "flexible production" and "welfare capitalism" but these countries are now widely regarded as failing (Freeman, 1987; Dore, 2000) . It is perhaps less well known that the early postwar period also saw a productivity drive based on the emulation of an earlier US model (mass production). Furthermore, such cycles in fashion have not been restricted to the post-1945 world. Exhortations to follow the German model after the "Made in Germany" scare of the late nineteenth century were hastily reversed after the First World War, albeit more for political than economic reasons (Williams, 1896) . And as early as the 1850s, a Parliamentary mission went to the United States to investigate the new machinery and production methods revealed at the Great Exhibition of 1851, and coined the phrase the "American System of Manufactures" in admiration of the first US model that commentators urged Britain to follow (Rosenberg, 1969) .
A historical perspective suggests that economic commentators' recent wholesale conversion to the US model and their accompanying distaste for the European model is unlikely to be very helpful. First, successful productivity performance requires a stable institutional framework for long term investments in human and physical capital. The European model has been particularly good at providing this during the last half century or so, and while Britain focused on Americanisation during the 1950s and 1960s, most West European countries first caught up with and then overtook Britain. Second, as countless historical episodes have shown, a country is constrained by its geography, and copying without adaptation to local circumstances is rarely a good policy. Geography has historically had quite a large impact on productivity differences between Europe and America, from the impact of resource abundance on factor proportions in manufacturing during the nineteenth century to the impact of land availability and population density on transport systems and the location of supermarkets in more recent times. Third, and arising out of the institutional and geographical differences, a historical perspective also highlights the need to pay attention to the different sectors of the economy when formulating policy. Circumstances can and do vary between sectors, but much conventional wisdom about growth policy is based on past studies of manufacturing, which now accounts for around 15 per cent of employment in Britain. Policies derived from research on manufacturing may not be of much help in improving productivity in the rapidly growing private services such as finance and business services, let alone in the equally rapidly expanding non-market service sectors such as education and health.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II sets out the latest quantitative evidence on Britain's comparative productivity performance, and this is followed in section III by evidence for the longer period since 1870, comparing Britain with the United States and Germany. Section IV then draws out some lessons from history, while section V applies these lessons to current policy concerns. Section VI concludes.
II. BRITAIN'S RECENT PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE
We begin by setting out Britain's recent productivity performance compared with the United States, Germany and France. Table 1 presents estimates readily available from OECD. For the total economy in 2002, labour productivity on this basis was nearly 30 per cent higher in the United States, a substantial lead which has been noted in countless studies. Note, however, that labour productivity was also 27.5 per cent higher in Germany and slightly more than 30 per cent higher in France. How, then, do we account for the apparently widespread belief that the US economy has undergone a productivity miracle during the last decade or so, while continental European economies are now suffering from chronic sclerosis? The answer seems to lie partly in the growth trajectories of the United States and Europe, particularly since 1995.
Hence since the mid 1990s labour productivity growth has accelerated in the United
States whereas it has decelerated in the total EU-15 and each of the three European countries in Table 1 (O'Mahony and van Ark, 2003) . However this concentration on acceleration or deceleration of growth rates, popular in the literature, obscures the fact that labour productivity growth rates since the mid 1990s in the United States were not much higher than in either Britain or Germany. We will return to this important distinction further below in the context of these countries' long run historical productivity record.
The other part of the answer lies in the greater labour force participation and hours worked per person in the United States, so that the US lead in Table 1 is higher in terms of GDP per capita than on a GDP per hour worked basis. Furthermore, since labour force participation and hours worked per person were already higher in Britain than in France and Germany in 1990, and this difference has increased since 1995, there is now no substantial difference in the level of GDP per capita between Britain and continental Europe. However, these differences in labour force participation and hours worked raise difficult issues concerning welfare, since it could be argued on the one hand that Europeans are prevented from working longer hours by excessive taxation and labour market regulation or on the other hand that Americans are forced to work longer hours than they wish due to external effects from the hours worked by others (Layard, 2003) . We do not wish to get embroiled in this debate over the appropriate number of hours worked on the two sides of the Atlantic, and will confine our comments here to differences in labour productivity.
These aggregate economy estimates are, however, affected by differences in methods employed to measure outputs, not least of which is the inclusion of nonmarket services (health, education and public administration) where nominal output is typically measured by inputs. In addition growth in productivity across time is affected by differences in the extent to which countries chain link their real GDP estimates and the treatment of quality change in measuring the output of the office machinery and electronic industries. Thus Table 2 presents estimates by broad sector excluding non-market services and using the internationally comparable industry series underlying O'Mahony and van Ark (2003) .
Beneath the aggregate figures are variations by broad sector. The basic picture was established in O'Mahony (1999) and Table 2 provides updates for output per hour worked on a comparative basis, indexed on the UK=100. These show a significant UK labour productivity gap with all three countries in both industry and market services, and the United States also ahead of Britain in agriculture. Note that since 1995 Britain has performed marginally better than the United States in industry but lost some ground in market services. Britain's productivity gap with Germany and France has narrowed in both industry and market services. By implication Table 2 shows the United States gaining some ground on Britain in market services and surging ahead of both Germany and France. Much of the literature on the recent US productivity experience has emphasised that the acceleration in US productivity growth was primarily due to market services, in particular those where Information and Communications Technology (ICT) is an important input (Triplett and Bosworth, 2003; O'Mahony and van Ark, 2003) . Table 2 also shows comparative labour productivity levels for the total market economy, which excludes non-market services and real estate. This shows a larger US lead over all three EU countries than is apparent from the aggregate economy figures, and furthermore this gap has been widening since 1995. Labour productivity growth in the non-market sector in the United States has been particularly poor over this time period, as shown in O'Mahony and van Ark (2003) , and this broad sector represents a much larger share of aggregate economic activity in the United States than in the European countries. However, as discussed in Triplett and Bosworth (2003) , part of the relatively poor US performance in non-market services, in particular in health, may be the result of measurement errors. Table 3 decomposes the comparative labour productivity levels for 2000 for the market economy in Table 2 into the contributions of physical capital, skills and TFP. This shows that total capital, made up of both physical capital and skills, accounts for nearly all the German and French labour productivity lead over Britain.
For the market economy, however, a substantial chunk of the US labour productivity lead over Britain is the result of higher TFP. The second panel of Table 3 shows a similar decomposition for total market services, which shows a similar picture of TFP accounting for a considerably greater proportion of the productivity gap comparing Britain with the US than with France and Germany.
III. BRITAIN'S LONG RUN PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE

Overview
Before considering policies to close Britain's productivity gap, it is helpful to understand the time-scale over which the problem has emerged and persisted. We begin by setting out Britain's comparative labour productivity performance at the aggregate level, focusing on the US/UK and Germany/UK cases over the period . The figures in Tables 4 and 5 refer to GDP per person engaged, but the levels and trends are very similar to Maddison's (1995; The broad outlines of Britain's comparative productivity performance on a sectoral basis first began to emerge following Broadberry's (1993) finding that long run comparative productivity trends in manufacturing followed a very different pattern from trends in the aggregate economy. The US/UK and Germany/UK cases are shown here in Figure 1 . In contrast to the situation at the aggregate level, in manufacturing there is no long run trend in comparative labour productivity. In 1870, US labour productivity in manufacturing was roughly twice the UK level, and this was also the case in the late twentieth century. Although there have been periods of sustained deviation from this two-to-one US labour productivity advantage, particularly following major wars, in the long run there has always been a return to this ratio. Similarly, there has been no long run change in the Germany/UK comparative labour productivity ratio, with Germany roughly on a par with Britain in both 1870 and 1990.
This large US labour productivity advantage in manufacturing since at least the mid-nineteenth century has attracted a great deal of attention since it was linked by Habakkuk (1962) to the abundance of land and natural resources in the United States. Habakkuk's argument was that resource abundance led to labour scarcity and hence (1) substitution of capital for labour in manufacturing and (2) labour saving technical progress. The first result, of resource abundance leading to greater capital intensity in manufacturing goes through so long as there is a complementarity between capital and resources (Ames and Rosenberg, 1968) . The second result, of resource abundance leading to labour saving technical progress has been demonstrated by David (1975) , drawing on a model of endogenous localised technical change from Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) . Broadberry (1997a) extends the argument into the twentieth century with the incorporation of human capital. The resource-using machinery was substituted for skilled labour in the United States, making good use of US natural resource abundance and skilled labour scarcity. However, US mass production methods were not well suited to European conditions of natural resource scarcity and skilled labour abundance. The large, homogeneous US market reinforced these technological differences, since mass production technology produced standardised products. US mass production technology can be seen as co-existing with European flexible production technology, with a process of innovation on one side of the Atlantic mirrored by imitation on the other side of the Atlantic, and with technical progress adapted to local circumstances on both continents.
Since manufacturing was the biggest industrial sector, and since agriculture had shrunk in importance to around two or three per cent of the labour force in all three countries by the late 1980s, reconciling the trends and levels of comparative productivity performance in manufacturing and the whole economy seemed to require a loss of British productivity leadership in services. This was first established by Broadberry (1997b; 1997c ) using a nine-sector breakdown. However, to bring out the crucial importance of services for understanding Britain's comparative productivity performance since 1870, it is sufficient to consider the results on the basis of a three-sector breakdown, covering agriculture, industry and services.
Sectoral analysis of the US/UK case
The importance of services to the changing US/UK comparative labour productivity level in the aggregate economy over the period can be seen in the sectoral breakdown of comparative productivity levels in Table 4 . To get the full picture, however, requires adding to this the sectoral breakdown of employment in the two countries, shown in Table 6 . Table 4 illustrates the point raised in the previous section that the long run trends in comparative labour productivity for the aggregate economy owe rather less to trends in industry than is usually assumed in accounts of comparative productivity performance. Hence, for example, between circa 1890 and 1990, the US labour productivity lead in industry declined slightly, while the United States went from a position of lower labour productivity to a 33 per cent lead in the aggregate economy. That is not to say that industry did not matter, particularly in shorter run fluctuations of comparative labour productivity. Indeed, Broadberry (1997a) notes that the US labour productivity lead in manufacturing increased significantly across World War I and again across World War II, but in each case, the increase was not sustained.
Note, second, that although the trend of comparative labour productivity in agriculture moved in the same direction as in the aggregate economy, with the United States overtaking Britain, this was not the really significant contribution of agriculture to changing comparative productivity performance at the aggregate level. The greater significance of agriculture was in its declining share of the labour force, which can be seen for both countries in Table 6 . The decline in agriculture's share of employment had a significant impact on aggregate labour productivity because agriculture is a relatively low value-added activity. Hence countries which have remained heavily oriented towards agriculture have also remained poor. Shifting labour from agriculture into higher value added industrial and service sectors hence acted to boost aggregate labour productivity. Note, however, that this shift out of agriculture occurred rather later in the United States than in Britain, thus contributing to the US catching-up. Whereas in about 1870, agriculture accounted for just 22.2 per cent of employment in Britain, it still accounted for a full half of the US labour force. By 1990, however, agriculture accounted for less than three per cent of employment in both countries.
An important point to note in Table 4 is that comparative labour productivity trends in services broadly mirror comparative labour productivity trends for the economy as a whole. The US overtook Britain in services during the 1890s, and forged ahead to the 1950s. Furthermore, since services grew in importance throughout the period in both countries, it is this loss of British productivity leadership in services that largely explains Britain's loss of overall productivity leadership (Broadberry and Ghosal, 2002) . Services also played an important role in shorter run fluctuations, frequently mirroring the patterns in the aggregate economy. And as emphasised in the earlier discussion of Table 2 , services are an important sector in explaining the acceleration in US labour productivity growth in recent years.
Sectoral analysis of the Germany/UK case
The importance of services to the changing Germany/UK comparative labour productivity level in the aggregate economy over the period can be seen in the sectoral breakdown of comparative productivity levels in Table 5 , together with the sectoral employment data in Table 6 . Again, the first point to note is that the long run trends in comparative productivity levels for the aggregate economy are less affected by trends in industry than is commonly thought. Thus, for example, between 1911 and 1990, the German labour productivity lead in industry declined while for the aggregate economy Germany went from three-quarters of the British level to a lead of more than 25 per cent. However, over shorter periods, there have been substantial movements in comparative Germany/UK levels in industry. Broadberry (1997a) emphasises the German forging ahead in manufacturing during the 1970s, with Germany attaining close to a 50 per cent labour productivity lead by the end of the decade. This was not sustained, however, and by the end of the 1980s, most of the German lead had been eliminated (Broadberry and Crafts, 2003) .
Second, although Germany's comparative productivity position in agriculture has improved since the late nineteenth century, agricultural labour productivity remained much lower in Germany than in Britain in 1990. Again the declining importance of agriculture as a share of the labour force requires emphasis. Since the shift of labour out of low-value-added agriculture occurred much later in Germany than in Britain, and even substantially later than in the United States, this had important implications for the lateness of German catching-up at the aggregate economy level. With such a large share of the German labour force tied up in low productivity agriculture before World War II, the overall labour productivity level was bound to be much lower in Germany than in Britain. On the other hand, once Germany shifted decisively out of agriculture after World War II, overall catching-up was rapid.
For the Germany/UK case in Table 5 , comparative labour productivity trends in services broadly mirror comparative labour productivity trends for the economy as a whole, as for the US/UK case in Table 4 . Again, the key to understanding Germany's overtaking of Britain at the aggregate level was the loss of British productivity leadership in services (Broadberry, 2004b) . Services also played an important role in the shorter run fluctuations, frequently mirroring the patterns in the aggregate economy.
IV. PRODUCTIVITY POLICY: SOME LESSONS FROM HISTORY
Postwar reconstruction and the Anglo-American Council on Productivity
During the Second World War, many British industrialists were forced to confront the much higher levels of labour productivity achieved in American industry, as the two economies were integrated in the Allied war effort. Wartime visits by British industrialists to the United States were followed up after the war by the AngloAmerican Council on Productivity (AACP), which sponsored visits by productivity teams made up of managers and trade unionists in a wide range of industries. This was followed by the first postwar "productivity drive", based largely on the emulation of the US mass production model (Hutton, 1953) .
Although other European countries adopted similar "productivity missions" as a condition of Marshall Aid, the Americanisation of industry was pursued more enthusiastically in Britain (Barjot, 2002) . Indeed, the British seem to have copied American organisational forms more closely than the Germans or French, but nevertheless been less successful. Thus, for example, it is striking that 72 per cent of the top 100 British companies had adopted the multi-divisional form by 1970, whereas the corresponding figure for Germany was only 40 per cent (Channon, 1973: 67; Dyas and Thanheiser, 1976: 29) . Similarly, the British mergers of the 1950s and 1960s that aimed to create "national champions" on the basis of volume production, proved disappointing, to say the least (Cowling et al, 1980; Meeks, 1977) . While Britain struggled to slowly narrow the productivity gap with the United States, Germany and most other west European countries closed the gap with the United States more rapidly and overtook Britain.
Perhaps the greatest irony of the postwar Americanisation of British industry, however, was the impact on human capital accumulation. Before the Second World War, Britain had quite high levels of apprenticeship in industry, closer to the high levels common in German industry than to the low levels prevalent in the United States, where semi-skilled labour was widely used to substitute for craft skilled labour in mass production processes (Broadberry and Wagner, 1996) . In Table 7 , we see that after the Second World War, although there was some reduction in the apprenticeship-to-employment ratio in German industry during the 1950s, this was reversed in the 1960s, and offset by an expansion of apprenticeship into the service sector. This reflected an institutional framework that provided strong incentives for the acquisition of intermediate level qualifications (Carlin, 1996; Soskice, 1994) Europe not only remained important in manufacturing, but was also extended into services on a large scale during the post-World War II period (Broadberry, 2004b) .
The detailed work of Prais (1995) and his co-authors on the implications of Britain's intermediate skills gap for productivity performance included case studies of services as well as manufacturing establishments Prais et al., 1989) .
While Britain was attempting unsuccessfully to emulate US productivity levels in manufacturing on the basis of relatively unskilled labour, Germany and other European countries were successfully overtaking Britain in services on the basis of a human capital policy emphasising intermediate level skills.
The rise and fall of the German and Japanese models
From the late 1960s, American manufacturing faced a challenge to its technological leadership. As well as the threat from a resurgent Germany, US manufacturing faced a growing competitive threat from Japan (Baily and Chakrabarti, 1988; Dertouzos et al. 1989 ). Both Germany and Japan were perceived from the 1960s onwards to be growing much more rapidly than Britain, and indeed Germany overtook Britain in terms of GDP per person engaged during the late 1960s (Denison, 1967; Maddison, 1995) . Hence the German and Japanese economies began to replace the United States as the new models to follow. Both countries were successful in manufacturing, with a return to a more customised approach to production, intensive in the use of skilled shopfloor labour. In this respect, German and Japanese flexible production was similar to earlier British-style craft production. However, given the dramatic decline in the costs of computation, modern flexible production became possible in a highvolume environment, thus being able to retain the most important advantages of Fordist mass production methods (Edquist and Jacobsson, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 ).
It may be supposed that British manufacturing would have been in a strong position to take advantage of modern German and Japanese flexible production methods during the 1970s and 1980s, since they had much in common with earlier British flexible production methods, including high levels of customisation by skilled workers. However, this turned out to be a very difficult period for British industry.
One problem arose from the decline of the training system for skilled shopfloor labour during the period of Americanisation. This meant that at a time when demand for skilled labour was reviving, the stock of skilled labourers had been run down and the apprenticeship system necessary for producing such workers was in serious decline.
Addressing these problems has taken time, and Britain still has a serious lack of workers qualified at the intermediate level despite several decades of government initiatives. Again, it should be emphasised that the skill shortages did not simply affect manufacturing, but were more widely spread across the economy, including the rapidly expanding service sector.
Further problems arose as a result of copying from abroad without sufficient adaptation to local circumstances. Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) highlight many of the problems associated with what they see as the attempted "Japanisation" of British industry during the 1980s. They assess the introduction into British manufacturing plants of a number of techniques which are seen as defining modern flexible production, including: just-in-time (JIT) production, total quality control, statistical process control (SPC), quality circles, cellular manufacturing, and flexible (temporal, numerical and functional) working (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 137) . Rather ominously, given the current plight of the company, their work highlights Rover as "leading the field" in the Japanisation of the British car industry, and includes some rather harsh self-assessments by the companies themselves of the success of the measures introduced (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 89; 132-174) . Particularly painful lessons seem to have been learned at Ford, where the imposition of new work practices led to the company's first national strike in a decade, and where the impact of the strike was magnified by the fact that the company had low stocks because of its move towards JIT production (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 110-113) .
The rise to general favour of the German and Japanese models during the 1970s and 1980s was replaced during the 1990s, however, by an equally general fall into disrepute. Indeed, it is not putting it too strongly to say that these countries have become seen as the basket cases of the OECD world since the mid-1990s. And the new country that has replaced Germany and Japan as the model to follow is ….. the United States.
ICT and the resurgence of the US model
As noted earlier, the second half of the 1990s saw an acceleration in the rate of economic growth in the United States, which was widely attributed to the diffusion of ICT. Early concerns about the lack of a productivity pay-off to ICT investments, known as the Solow paradox, began to give way to findings of positive returns to ICT spending at the firm level (Brynjolfson and Hitt, 1996) . Eventually, even at the macro level, evidence emerged of a strong contribution of ICT capital to the acceleration of labour productivity growth (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000; Oliner and Sichel, 2000) .
Although researchers have also found evidence of some contribution to labour productivity growth from ICT capital deepening in European countries, the effect has been smaller (Colecchia and Schreyer, 2001; Inklaar et al., 2003; Cette et al., 2002; Oulton, 2001 ). Many economic commentators have drawn from these findings the conclusion that European economies have become too sclerotic and are in need of drastic reform along US lines (OECD, 2003; Gust and Marquez, 2002; HM Treasury, 2000) .
Although there may be dangers in sticking with tried and trusted methods when technological circumstances change, as Crafts (2004) points out, a historical perspective also suggests that there are good reasons to be cautious about an overenthusiastic embrace of the fashionable model of the day. In our view, this applies to the US model today, perhaps even more than in the 1950s and 1960s. The first point to note is that the differences between countries in both productivity levels and growth rates are relatively small. Part of the reason for the widespread enthusiasm about US growth rates after 1995 can be seen clearly from Table 8 , which slows the slowness of US growth in the period before 1995 while Europe was catching-up (Field, 2004; Crafts, 2004) . Any differences in productivity growth rates during the period 1995-2003 have been very small in comparison with the differences during the period . Even in the market sector, the US growth performance is not that much better than the European countries.
A second reason for caution about orienting policy too strongly towards the US model is that Europe is anyway moving in the direction of adopting ICT, but in ways consistent with local circumstances. This view receives support from recent models of growth resulting from general purpose technology (GPT) (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Helpman, 1998; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Bresnahan et al., 2002; Basu et al., 2003) . These models suggest that when a GPT is first put in place, it might reduce measured output because it is correlated with unmeasured investments in complementary capital, such as training and re-organisation of the production process. Once these investments have been put in place, however, the impact of the GPT becomes positive. Basu et al. (2003) , applying OLS to a cross-section of US and UK industries, find that TFP growth is positively correlated with past investments in ICT, while it is negatively correlated with contemporaneous investments, consistent with GPT theory. They also suggest there may be differences in the lag structures in the two countries. It is important to emphasise once again from historical experience that previous attempts by British governments to force the pace on the adoption of new technologies and their associated organisational changes have not been very successful. This probably shows up most obviously in the postwar period in the policy of encouraging mergers to bring about national champions with large enough market shares to justify investment in mass production technologies (Turner, 1969: 81-86; Cowling et al., 1980) . The disastrous performance of a number of recent government IT projects serves to underline this conclusion (Committee of Public Accounts, 2002; .
A third point that can be made here concerns the impact on human capital. We Germany has in abundance are no longer suitable for the world of modern technology (Crafts, 2004: 141-142) . However, whilst it is clearly true that that computers and related technologies were initially very complex to use, their widespread adoption has coincided with drastic simplification. Thus it is unclear if the new technology will continue to be biased in favour of relatively expensive university graduates.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT POLICY
The importance of the institutional framework
One of the key messages of economic history is that institutions matter. North (1990) defines institutions as the "rules of the game", which define and limit the set of choices that people can make. For North, institutions include both formal and informal constraints, i.e. not just written rules but also unwritten conventions and codes of behaviour, which seem to enter the subconscious and become highly persistent. This inevitably makes institutions difficult to change, and can lead to perverse results from changes in the formal rules. It can also make it difficult to transplant one part of an institutional system from one country to another. We have already encountered the example where the introduction of JIT methods at Ford without Japanese-style industrial relations amplified the effects of a strike (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992: 110-113 ).
Let us now delve a little more deeply into the institutional framework in Germany. Many economic commentators argue that Germany today is beset by restrictive regulations which need to be removed, to make Germany more like the United States or Britain since 1979. There may well be an element of truth in this, but consider the analysis of Carlin (1996) , who examines the way that the German institutional framework encourages accumulation. She argues that a centralised system of industrial relations has provided a solution to the free-rider problem of firms poaching skilled workers. She also argues that the ability of firms to invest heavily in training has been underpinned by strong links between banks and firms, with the former taking a longer term view than is usual in the British system. The view taken of the desirability of such long-term bank-industry relations may be less favourable if one focuses on the service sector rather than industry, but it is difficult not to be impressed by the extent of the accumulation of human and physical capital in Germany.
Institutional economists argue that successful productivity performance requires a stable institutional framework to encourages long term investments in human and physical capital as well as innovation and enterprise. The European model has been particularly good at the former over the last half century or so, and continues to be so today. Hence although the accounting framework in Table 3 suggests that the US labour productivity lead over Britain is largely due to more innovation and enterprise, it also suggests that Europe has roughly the same labour productivity lead over Britain as a result of more investment in human and physical capital. Since the labour productivity gap is similar in the two cases, and since there are important differences in the distributional and wider social consequences of the two outcomes, it seems odd that policies to raise labour productivity in Britain are geared only towards following the US model and avoiding the European model.
The importance of geography and adaptation to local circumstances
One worrying feature about the current widespread enthusiasm for the US model is the very different geography of North America compared with Europe. We have already seen that over the long run geography has played a big role in explaining trans-Atlantic labour productivity differences going back at least as far as the nineteenth century in the case of manufacturing. Furthermore, we have seen how attempts to adopt American mass production methods in the 1950s and 1960s without sufficient adaptation to local circumstances ended not only in a disappointing productivity outcome, but also adversely affected human capital accumulation through the demise of the apprenticeship system for training skilled labour, a particular strength of the postwar German economy, and widely continued in other west European countries.
It may well be the case now that these geographical differences will be of more importance in service sectors such as transport and distribution. On the railways, for example, geography can be seen as playing a role in explaining the substantial US labour productivity lead, since the terminal handling element is proportionately larger on the short-haul routes that dominate British rail business, a point which has long been recognised in the literature (Rostas, 1948; Smith et al., 1982; O'Mahony et al., 1998) . One sector highlighted in a recent report by McKinsey Global Institute (1998) illustrates the problems that can arise if geographical considerations are ignored.
McKinsey pointed to the existence of a substantial US labour productivity lead over Britain in retailing, and argued that the problem was the lack of sufficient large out- 
The importance of sectoral considerations
We have noted at a number of points in this paper that changes in comparative productivity performance at the aggregate level have been driven to a large extent by trends in services. Whilst this is now becoming widely recognised in debates concerning the present, with the share of manufacturing in total employment falling below 20 per cent in Britain, the important role of services in earlier developments stretching back into the nineteenth century, is much less widely perceived. This poses a serious problem for evidence-based policy, because much of the empirical evidence concerning the link between policy and productivity performance is based on manufacturing (Nickell, 1996; OECD, 2003; Gust and Marquez, 2002; Blundell et al., 1999) .
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VI. CONCLUSION
Countries fall in and out of fashion as desirable models of economic growth. At the moment most economic commentators favour the American model with ICT as the elixir of growth. Before that, from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, Germany and Japan were the favoured models, with flexible production seen as the key to economic growth. And during the period from the end of World War II to the end of the 1960s, America was again seen as the fashionable model, with mass production the key to success. It is clearly tempting to copy from abroad when another country appears to be doing well, but historical experience suggests the need for caution. Unless policies are adapted to local circumstances they may end up doing as much harm as good.
Postwar Americanisation led not only to the disasters of British Leyland, Alfred Herbert, ICL, British Shipbuilders etc. in the different market circumstances, but also exacerbated shortages of skilled labour by downgrading the importance of the apprenticeship. Later attempts at Japanisation also created problems as parts of the Japanese flexible production system were grafted on to a different institutional system.
In conclusion, we would emphasise three points. First, successful productivity performance requires a stable institutional framework for long term investments in human and physical capital, which the European model has been particularly good at providing over the last half century. The recent emphasis in Britain on university education at the expense of intermediate skills is worryingly reminiscent of the damaging downgrading of apprenticeships in the early postwar period. Second, a country is constrained by its geography, so that copying without adaptation to local circumstances is rarely a good policy. What works in land-abundant North America (e.g. unrestricted development of out-of-town retailing) may not be transferable to Britain without major modification. Third, it is important to pay attention to the different sectors of the economy when formulating policy. Virtually all of the quantitative evidence that we have on the factors affecting productivity growth refers to manufacturing, which now accounts for only around only 15 per cent of employment in Britain. Ark (2003) . Note a consistency check using industry specific PPPs yields estimates close to the aggregate economy ones shown in Table 1 for the US and German comparisons but imply a somewhat smaller French lead. This is partially due to the use of different PPPs but also reflects differences in annual hours worked in the O'Mahony and van Ark dataset relative to OECD numbers. Broadberry (1997b; 1997c; . 1950 -1990 unified Germany thereafter Sources: 1950 -1973 , O'Mahony and de Boer (2002 1973 , OECD as for Table  1 .
